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SUMMER, 1950

NUMBER 3

AUTOMOBILE RIGHT OF WAY IN MARYLAND"
By
PAUL

F. DUE*

BnD H. BIsHOP**

When Justice Holmes said "such words as 'right' are a
constant solicitation to fallacy",' he was dealing with the
problem of the constitutional power of a state to embody in
a statute a custom prevailing in real property law for many
decades and in no wise concerned with the subject presently
under discussion. Yet one cannot but note how truly applicable this statement becomes when viewed in relation to
our automobile right of way law. A fleeting glance at the
numerous decisions in this field will at once serve to show
how eminently sound his observation was, and indeed it
may serve as the underlying theme of the whole of this
article. The cases studding this portion of the law invariably turn upon the view of the Court as to one's "right" or
"right of way" as created by statute.
The statutory right of way law as originally enacted in
1916 has been changed but slightly since it was first passed:2
"Except as hereinafter provided, all vehicles or
trackless trolleys shall have the right of way over other
vehicles or trackless trolleys approaching at intersecting public roads from the left, and shall give right of
way to those approaching from the right."
t This is the companion article to Motorists and Pedestrians - A Study
of the Judicial Process in Relation to the Statutory Right of Way Law in

Maryland, 11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950), by the same authors.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar, LL.B., 1923, University of Maryland School
of Law.
** Of the Baltimore City Bar, A.B., 1942, Johns Hopkins University, LL.B.,
1950, University of Maryland School of Law; Co-Chairman, Student Editorial Board, Maryland Law Review, Vol. XI.
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922).
Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 66%, Sec. 176. The Act of 1916 did not contain the words "trackless trolley", nor was the word "roads" preceded by
"public".
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We propose to consider this enactment first in the light
of the time at which it became law, and then to follow the
cases arising under it down to the present day, for it is
believed that this is the most satisfactory method of analysis
in this situation.
In 1916 there were 3,617,937 motor vehicles in use in the
United States, and today there are some 40,988,831.' This
tremendous national increase can safely be assumed to have
a corresponding ratio of increase in Maryland, showing just
how great a surge there has been in that field. An even
more graphic picture is presented if we look at the number
of miles of State roads here as of 1916 and then compare it
to our 1949 figures. They increased from 191 to 4,558 in
these 34 years. 4 Thus it was that at the time of the original
enactment of this law there was no great nor pressing need
for regulation of the passage of vehicles over the streets
and highways. Those vehicles which were in existence were
not the rapidly accelerating swift moving cars of today, but
instead were so cumbersome and slow that the top speed
laws on an open highway were 35 miles per hour.' Two
things alone have remained more or less constant through
the development of vehicular traffic from 1916 to date,
namely the width of the streets and the distance from the
curb lines back to the building lines. While the autos were
gaining more and more speed and power, and increasing in
number, these distances remained about the same. Some
few streets were widened, but very few in proportion to
the total number of streets in the State. So it is then, that
when an attempt is made to study the cases first arising
under the statute, it must always be born in mind that the
case must be put in its proper context, both as to place and
time, for that which would horrify as to speed and judgment
aA.omoTmLE FACTS AND FIGURES (29th ed.), 1949. A breakdown of these
figures shows that in 1916 there were 3,367,889 automobiles and 250,048
trucks registered in the United States. In 1949 there were 33,261,451 automobiles and 7,727,380 trucks so registered.
' Report of State Roads Commission 1908-1920; the 1949 figure was secured
from the Traffic Division of the State Roads Commission.
5Md. Laws (1916), Ch. 687, Sec. 149. This same section provided that
speeds of 12 m.p.h. in business parts of cities, towns, or villages, 18 m.p.h. In
outlying parts of same, or 25 m.p.h. in open country, should be prima facie
evidence of operating at a speed greater than was reasonable or proper.
35 m.p.h. was the maximum speed on any highway under any conditions.
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in 1916-1920 would be equally amazing to us today should
we find the same speed and judgment inveighed against as
negligent and reckless.
The statute had a quiet existence for some 4 years after
its passage, as only one case arose during that time, and
it involved simply a determination that the right of way
rule did not apply to trolley cars or other vehicles which
operated solely on tracks.' This case contained no unusual
features since the act had excluded such vehicles from its
comprehension. It was not until 1920 that there was before
the court a case which presented an opportunity for expression of the court's view as to the raison d'etre of the statute,
and in the opinion, it said:
"The mischief for which the Act was enacted as a
remedy was this: That in the case of automobiles
approaching each other along connecting roads running
at an angle to each other in such a manner that unless
one of them gave way to the other a collision would
result, in the absence of some rule on the subject, there
would be no way of promptly determining which
should give way to the other, and the confusion incident
to such situations was the cause of many accidents."7
In this statement, we find the first discussion by the court
as to the meaning to be placed on the regulation. Its purpose seems clearly defined, but we note that here the court
was dealing only with a situation wherein two cars were
approaching each other on intersecting roads at lawful
rates of speed, and there was to be decided only who must
yield to the other. There was no problem there as to speed,
visibility, or a reasonable ground for believing the other
would stop. These variables all came into the picture a bit
later to cloud that which was in 1920 a clearly delineated
problem of logistics.
The instant case, being one wherein each vehicle reached
the intersection at approximately the same time, was well
suited to a discussion, such as set forth by the Court, of the
effect and purpose of the law under such circumstances.
*1 State v. Baltimore & Belair E. Ry., 133 Md. 411, 105 A. 532 (1919).
Buckey v. White, 137 Md. 124, 129, 111 A. 777 (1920).
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In view of the absence of great speed by one or the other, or
poor visibility, there was neither the requirement of, nor
the opportunity for, any extended discussion of the entire
function sought to be performed by the regulation. As is
well known, the Court refrains from discussing matters not
germane to the issues involved, and here it would be making
an unwarrantable assumption to say that because of its
brief characterization of the statute in the light of the facts
as they appeared, the Court regarded it as it would a StopLook - Listen sign at a railroad crossing, i.e., as being a
mandatory requirement that under all circumstances the
car from the right be granted the first passage. Such a
proposition was argued to the Court the same year in
Chiswell v. Nichols,8 where plaintiff was a passenger in a
car struck on its right side by defendant, who was attempting to make a left turn from a road intersecting the one
used by plaintiff's host. There the Court, in reversing a
directed verdict for defendant, refused to recognize any
such absolute right of precedence under any and all circumstances, and said:
"It may be said, because of this statute and the rights
conferred thereby, that the first and chief thought and
care of the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersecting road should be given to those vehicles that
might be approaching him from the right and, for the
safety of those using the public roads, too much stress
cannot be laid upon the importance of so doing. At the
same time, the traveller is not, because of the statute
S.. altogether relieved of the necessity of observing
the condition of the road to his left, with a view of
ascertaining whether or not the road is clear and free
of persons and vehicles approaching from that direction. Especially is this true when a vehicle having the
right of way ... is to turn to its left. . .. "'
In this language, we see that the Court did not intend
to allow the statute to make any great inroads on the common law rules of the road - and no doubt wisely so, for
in the final analysis that which is the most eminently
8 137 Md. 201, 112 A. 363 (1920).
0 I4b., 306.
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desired end for such regulation is the safety and well being
of the public using the roads. One could scarcely quarrel
with any attempt to reach such a millennium. The Court
here recognized that the statutory language was going to
be difficult of strict construction in itself, because of those
cases bound to arise under it wherein injustice would be
done to one or the other parties if the rule were to be
rigidly or inelastically applied. To forestall such a situation, we find the Court early in the game erecting a wall
about the statute in certain cases by holding, that while
the one on the left, who should have yielded the right of
way failed to do so, still he was not, without more, to be
held judicially negligent. Thus by delimiting the statutory
right to those factual situations where both cars arrived
at the intersection at the same time, the Court found a
method by which the beneficial effects of the law could be
nurtured without at the same time producing inequitable
results in the other cases where it would be manifestly
unfair to apply the same type of test for negligence vel
non.

10

While admitting that there is some justification for the
complaint that such a judicial program breeds uncertainty
and tends to encourage litigation on the part of the unfavored driver in the hopes of going to a sympathetic jury,
still it must be noted that this is a peculiarly difficult situation for the court to solve, and in an attempt to reach a
satisfactory and workable solution in all types of cases,
this result emerged. The cases themselves serve to point
up the extremely fine line which must be drawn between
apparently analagous cases, and prediction as such is never
simplified under such circumstances. Yet it is believed that
such an approach is, under the circumstances, the one best
suited to achieve proper judicial results under the statute.
10Cf., Hopper MeGaw v. Kelly, 145 Md. 161, 169, 125 A. 779 (1924), where
in an accident which occurred due to the vision of both drivers being
obstructed by a street car, the Court said :
"While it Is the settled rule in this state that the mere violation of a
statute or ordinance does not of itself support an action for damages,
it is also well settled that where such a violation is the proximate cause
of an injury, a right of action does accrue to the party injured."
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Two years later the Court decided Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter," which decision has come to be the rock upon which
unfavored plaintiffs ever since have attempted to build
their cases. Plaintiff testified that he was driving South
on Monroe Street at 15 miles per hour in a zone where 15
miles per hour was the speed limit, and when he got to the
building line of Presbury Street, he looked to his right.
He stated that he could see for half a block to the right,
and there was no traffic approaching him. He continued
across, and when he was three quarters of the way across
he was struck at the right rear by defendant who was
driving East on Presbury. The plaintiff's car was turned
over by the force of the blow. A pedestrian who appeared
as a witness for plaintiff stated that defendant was going
30 miles per hour, and that when plaintiff was about half
way across the street, the defendant was still 75 feet West
of the intersection. Defendant claimed he was going 8 miles
per hour, well within the speed limit, that when he got to
the intersection, he saw plaintiff coming from his left and
when he saw plaintiff was not going to stop, he stopped
himself. He stated that plaintiff kept on and struck the
left front of his car with the right rear of plaintiff's car.
The jury found for plaintiff, and on appeal the Court, after
outlining the facts of the accident, answered defendant's
contention that a verdict should have been directed for
him on the ground that plaintiff, in failing to give defendant the right of way, was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of the law. It said: 12
"It was not necessary for the plaintiff to look as
far as his eye could reach to his right before proceeding across the intersecting street. His duty in that respect was performed if he looked sufficiently far to his
right to discover that there was no traffic approaching
from that direction within a distance that would be
traversed by a vehicle driven at a speed permitted by
the law. He was not required to look always to his
right while crossing the street, as he had to avoid endangering travel ahead of him, or approaching from his
u 151 Md. 525, 135 A: 587 (1926).
=Ibid., 530.

1950]

AUTOMOBILE RIGHT OF WAY

left.... While it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to
respect the rule giving the right of way, at street intersections, to vehicles approaching from the right, yet
if the way for a safe distance was clear of traffic coming
from that direction, he should not judicially be declared
negligent in not providing against the possibility of
collision with a car which could not come into dangerous proximity to his own unless it were unlawfully
operated.... It could hardly be said that the driver of
the cab had the right of way, if he could not exercise it
except by violation of the speed laws of the state."13
This decision was seized on immediately by unfavored
plaintiffs who saw in it the means of clearing from their
path to recovery the hitherto embarrassing and discouraging spectre of a defense based on the right of way statute.
This language was perfectly suited to achieve such an end,
and even though plaintiff had no guarantee that the jury
would find for him, he was secure in the knowledge that
in most cases he would stand a chance of having a jury
pass on the question of his contributory negligence vel non
in violating the rule.
The case has, however, other aspects which we believe
should be pointed out here, for they have played a very
major role in much of the litigation following it. It should
be noted that while the Court had before it facts and figures
as to distances and speeds, it never made any direct reference to them, but contented itself with speaking of "a distance that would be traversed by a vehicle driven at a
speed permitted by the law", 4 and "if the way for a safe,
distance was clear of traffic . . .". It would probably be a
safe assumption that the Court had reference to plaintiff's
testimony that he could see half a block to his right, or to
witnesses' testimony that defendant was 75 feet west of
plaintiff when the latter was half way across the street. Yet,
even with this assumption, does the Court's language lay
down any concrete requirement as to maximum or minimum distances required before one could say that the way
was clear for a "safe distance"? A re-reading will readily
Italics supplied.
1,Supra, n.12.
Supra, n.11, 531.
2
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show that it does not. The Court has applied the test of
reasonable care to the situation here just as it did in the
pedestrian cases where pedestrian was struck between intersections16 and has carefully avoided any flat commitment
as to what constitutes compliance with the rule it sets out.
Perhaps the fate of Mr. Justice Holmes' attempt to set
out "once for all", 1" a rule governing the degree of care
required to be exercised in traversing a railroad grade crossing, was responsible for this reticence, but whatever the
reason, no flat ruling was forthcoming. Later developments
in the automotive industry, however, have more than vindicated their stand, because the "safe distances" which would
then have been reasonable with cars capable of a top speed
of 25 or 30 would be far too short to be reasonable today.
The very fact that the speed laws have increased from 15
to 25 in those years is mute testimony as to what changes
would have had to be made in the legal rule to accompany
the technical developments of the machine. Nonetheless,
though no figures were quoted, we find here the birth of a
troublesome idea that by proving distances and speed, a
formula for right of way cases can be worked out. The
Court has seldom accepted such formulas" but has decided
the cases on the negligence basis long ago established, which
is flexible enough to be easily adaptable to new techniques
both in mechanical and judicial fields. Thus the "safe distance" of 1926 expands to remain the "safe distance" in
1950 though in feet it no longer resembles itself at all.
9 set a new style of
So Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter"
approach in right of way cases, and yet it was in reality no
more than a logical extension of the rule earlier laid down
in the Chiswell 0° and Hopper McGaw 2" cases, namely that
while the right of way statute does offer an area of protection to the one on the right when both reach the intersec1 Discussed In Due and Bishop, Motorists and Pedestrians,11 Md. L. Rev.
1 (1950).
1B. & 0. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927), requiring the driver of a motor
vehicle to get out and look to see if the way over railroad tracks were clear.
This rule was disregarded by many state courts as impractical.
IsLegum v. Hough, 63 A. 2d 316 (Md. 149), discussed infra, n. 57.
19151 Md. 525, supra, n. 11.
137 Md. 291, supra, n. 8.
145 Md. 161, supra, n. 10.
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tion more or less simultaneously, it does not operate via
extension to give such priority where the one on the right
is a considerable distance away when the unfavored driver
reaches the intersection.
The Court's next encounter with the right of way statute
came in the Friedman cases in 1930 and 1931.22 Here again
the plaintiff, the unfavored driver, sought to recover damages sustained when she ran into defendant's truck at the
intersection. The unusual phase of this case was that the
defendant was over on the wrong side of the street when the
accident occurred. The plaintiff, in reply to the defendant's
argument that her failure to yield the right of way was a
bar to her recovery, said that the proximate cause of the
accident was the defendant's failure to keep to the right of
the center of the street as required by statute. The trial
court refused defendant's request for a directed verdict, but
the jury found for defendant after hearing the whole case.
On appeal, the Court said in discussing the right of way
legislation:23
"The purpose of the statute was to regulate the use
of public highways by vehicles passing over them, by
prescribing certain rules designed to insure the safety
of all persons in the lawful use thereof, and by punishing any violation of such rules, but it contains nothing
which can support the inference that it was intended
to create a cause of action in a civil proceeding, inuring
to a traveler on such highways against another violating those rules, unless such violation was the direct and
proximate cause of any injury to such traveler. In other
words the mere violation of the rules prescribed by the
section will not constitute actionable negligence, unless
it is the direct and proximate cause of injury to the
person charging negligence."2 4
Again we find the Court saying that the statute was
designed to regulate the use of highways by prescribing
rules of precedence, yet the statute will be unavailing if
the proximate cause of the accident is not that which
2 Friedman v. Hendler Creamery Co., 158 Md. 131, 148 A. 426 (1930) ; 160
Md. 526, 154 A. 93 (1931).
158 Md. 131, 142, 148 A. 426 (1930).
Cf., n. 10.
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violates the statute. The argument was that the proximate
cause was defendant's being on the wrong side of the street
where plaintiff did not expect him to be, although plaintiff
had not intended to turn into the street occupied by defendant. Had she obeyed the statute and yielded the right of
way to defendant, she would not have been forced to try
to turn right after finding that she was unable to stop in
time to avoid the collision which would occur if she kept
going straight ahead. The reasoning is very close here, and
leads up to the second appeal in the case after a new trial.
There the Court was faced with an argument that it was
improper to instruct the jury that because of the statute
all vehicles approaching a street intersection from the right
have the right of way. The opinion reads in part:2
"In view of the former decisions of this Court... 2 6
it is clear that a vehicle approaching an intersection
from the right does not have an absolue right of way in
every instance, because that question must be determined by the circumstances in any given case."
The Court here simply points up for us the conclusion
to which we are inescapably drawn, that such has to be
the result in these very close cases of fact. It is difficult at
best to resolve these situations other than by sending them
to the jury, and the Court seems to feel that such solution
is in all respects a most practical one from any point of
view.27 Thus the Ottenrittercase, while certainly a leading
one in the field and followed in many subsequent cases2" as
160 Md. 526, 530, 154 A. 93 (1931).
Citing Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, supra,n. 11.
- See Feinglos v. Weiner, 181 Md. 38, 41, 28 A. 2d 577 (1942), where the
Court said:
"Counsel often overlook one important fact in the trial of automobile
cases, and that is, that on every jury are some men who drive automobiles, most of them carefully, and many of them well. Given the facts
accurately, they know whether a collision or injury was the fault of
one or the other or both, or neither of them."
28 See Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 142, 152 A. 813
(1931), another case
of an unfavored plaintiff who looked to his right when he was 60 feet from
the corner and saw no traffic for 180 feet, but was struck on right side as he
crossed the street. The Court said:
"It is contended that, if plaintiff had looked to his right when he
reached the intersection, he must have seen the Jackson car in time to
have avoided the collision. But a like contention was unsuccessfully
made in Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter. . . . In that case ... we said that
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authoritative in like situations, represents but the culmination of many factors which, when combined factually in a
case for decision, call for a result which is not to be achieved
by rigid application of the statutory rule, but rather by
means of the time honored rule of reasonable care.29
There is presented another phase of the problem of right
of way in Paoliniv. Western Mill & Lumber Co.8 ° For the
first time, the Court made use of a mathematical formula
to arrive at the speed of one of two vehicles involved in an
accident. The cases from Ottenritter on have all contained
references to comparative speeds, distances and time, but
until the Paolinicase was decided the Court had never done
more than toy with the idea that these ratios of speed and
time to distance could be used to advantage by one side or
the other. Here we see how such use is possible, and also
how easy it is for error and mistake to creep in.
The plaintiff's testimony was that he was driving West
on Laurens Street at about 8 or 10 miles per hour on a
plaintiff's duty in that respect was performed if he looked sufficiently far
to his right to discover that there was no traffic approaching. .. ."
The quotation from the Ottenritter case continued as in n. 12, supra. The
decision was based solely on that case as authority. So too in Jersey Ice
Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285, 292, 157 A. 277 (1931), in a similar case
where there was testimony that defendant was exceeding the speed limit
and struck plaintiff on the right rear when plaintiff was half way across the
street, the Court granted plaintiff's prayer that if the jury find that plaintiff
was actually crossing the street intersection at a time when defendant was
so far away that no one would reasonably anticipate a collision, then plaintiff was not judicially to be declared negligent in not waiting for defendant
to pass. On appeal, the Court quoted extensively from the Ottenritter
opinion, saying, among other things:
it is an incorrect as"As we said in Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, ...
sumption that, as between vehicles approaching a street intersection, the
one coming from the right has an absolute right of way, regardless of its
distance from the intersection when the other vehicle entered it from
the left, and regardless also of the relative rates of speed at which the
two were moving."
It should be noted here, however, that in one later case the court's language seems to go further than any hitherto found, in reading into the
statute, as written, a qualification which all the prior cases treated, not as
a qualification, but rather as a separate matter, divorced from the statute,
due to the fact that the cars did not reach the intersecion at the same time,
thus making the statute inapplicable. In the case of Billotti v. Saval, 165
Md. 563, 566, 168 A. 890 (1933), the Court said:
"The plaintiff had no inflexible and absolute privilege to proceed,
since, under the rule, due regard must be had to the distance of plaintiff's automobile from the intersection as compared with the distance of
the truck coming from the left, when seen, and the respective rates of
speed at which the two vehicles approached the intersection." (Italics
supplied.)
165 Md. 45, 166 A. 609 (1933).
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rainy day, and when he got to the East curb line of Stricker
Street, the defendant was 70 feet South of Laurens Street.
He further stated that defendant was speeding. The defendant testified that he was going North on Stricker Street at
about 10 miles per hour and when he reached the building
line on the South side of Laurens Street, plaintiff was 75
feet East on Laurens Street coming fast. In its opinion the
Court said: "I
"At the building line of Laurens Street, where defendant's driver first saw plaintiff on Laurens Street,
60 or 75 feet East of Stricker Street, he was, as we have
said, 8 or 10 feet from the South line of Laurens Street.
As this street is 39 feet wide, it is 191 feet from its
South line to the middle of it. The truck driver was
therefore about 30 feet from the place where the collision occurred when he saw the plaintiff's car 60 or 75
feet West (sic) of Stricker Street. He said he was
going 8 or 10 miles per hour. At that rate of speed he
covered about 30 feet while plaintiff in his car covered
a little more than twice that distance. Consequently,
by the defendant driver's own evidence, the plaintiff
was not going much more than 20 miles per hour .... "
No one could find fault with the calculations themselves,
but when we examine the premises upon which they are
founded, then another query is posed. The results are
perfectly sound, provided that the ciphers on which they
are based are accurate representations of existing fact and there is the rub. That few persons, especially those
involved in an accident, can accurately gauge either distance or speed, let alone a combination of both, is perhaps
but obvious. Day after day in Court we see witnesses in
perfect good faith contradicting themselves on just these
points, making their testimony no more than a guess or at
best an estimate of speed or distance. Yet the formula used
by the Court is based on just this same type of testimony.
Let us see just what the results would have been in this
case had defendant's guess as to speed or distance been
slightly different. The speed limit in Baltimore City in
- Ibid., 53.
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1933 was 20 miles per hour.32 Had defendant testified that
he was going 15 - 18 miles per hour, with all other facts
remaining the same, then by his testimony, it would be
shown that since plaintiff went twice as far as defendant in
the same period of time, that the plaintiff was going 30 or
35 miles per hour, thus exceeding the speed limit. Or had
he testified that he was at the curbline when Dlaintiff was
75 feet away thus having defendant travel only 20 feet
while plaintiff went 70 feet - then again plaintiff's speed
would be three times defendant's 10 miles per hour again
over the speed limit. It is suggested that defendant could
quite conscientiously give such testimony which might or
might not be true in fact, and plaintiff would have great
difficulty disproving it. In view of the difficulties of applying any such formulas to the facts before it, it is not surprising to find that only in two other cases has the Court
made use of this apparatus, and with somewhat peculiar
results as will be noted post."
This case was followed by one in which plaintiff, a guest
in the defendant's car, was injured when the car in which
he was riding was struck on the left rear by another car
at an intersection.3 4 The plaintiff and defendant had been
'Md. Laws (1933), Ch. 281, Sec. 194(3).
8Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545, 6 A. 2d 246 (1939) ; Legum v. Hough, 63 A.
2d 316 (1949), discussed infra, circa, ns. 43 and 69. For an illustration of
the Court's use of the same technique discussed infra, where the Court
never mentions distances per se, but the result of its decision can only be
achieved by use of the same formula, see Hess v. Loftus, 173 Md. 284, 288,
195 A. 556 (1938). There plaintiff testified that as he reached the curb line
of the intersecting street, while going 18 m.p.h. he saw defendant 150 feet
away on his right. Thinking that he had time to cross he continued but was
struck when only % of the way across the 40 foot intersection. The Court
in reversing a directed verdict for defendant said:
"Again, if the jury should find the facts offered on the part of the
plaintiff, there is legally sufficient testimony tending to prove that the
driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a guest drove across
Preston Street in the reasonable belief of an ordinarily careful and
cautious person that the automobile of the defendant . . . was so far
away from the intersection that the automobile in which the plaintiff
rode could proceed and cross the street in safety before the automobile
of the defendant would reach the intersection. The driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding is not negligent as a matter
of law in failing to guard against the possibility of a collision with an
automobile which would have to be operated at an unlawful rate of
speed to make the passage of the intersection unsafe, unless the driver
was aware of the unlawful rate of speed in time to avoid its consequences in the exercise of a reasonable degree of care and caution."
"Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 189 A. 260 (1936).
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in Baltimore visiting several night clubs prior to the accident, and from the opinion it seems obvious that there had
been considerable drinking, though there is no testimony
that defendant's servant and chauffeur had done any drinking. The accident occurred as the defendant's car, being
driven North at a rate of 50 or 60 miles per hour, and never
stopping for an intersection, was struck by another car
coming from the left unseen by anyone in defendant's car.
It was contended by defendant that even admitting he had
been going 50 or 60 miles per hour, still the proximate legal
cause of the accident was the failure of the other car to
yield the right of way at the corner, and that such failure
should exonerate defendant in spite of his speed. The court
disposed of this case by an application of its doctrine as
enumerated in the Ottenrittercase, saying: 5
" '... so the general rule applicable, under ordinary
circumstances,was that all vehicles shall have the right
of way over other vehicles approaching at intersecting
public roads from the left.' It is a rule that applies
only in appropriatecircumstances,that is, when the two
drivers come to the crossing in such proximity in point
of time as to require accommodation of one to the
other.... Determination of the right of way, thus left
to the drivers, in each instance, commonly involves the
exercise of some judgment, the driver from the left
being required to yield to avoid apparent chances of
collision... But one which comes from the right at such
a speed as 60 miles an hour in disregard of other traffic,
creates a different situation, adding a difficulty and
hazard which the driver cannot trust the ordinary
accommodation at crossings to render safe for his
passengers. 6
Here we have perhaps the most excellent example of
why the Court cannot in good conscience apply the statute
as a rule of thumb in total disregard of any or all other
circumstances. One's sense of justice and fair play would
- Ibid., 357.
This type of treatment of the statute has not escaped the notice of the
court for In Askin v. Long, supra, n. 33, 548, Sloan, J., said:
"It must be admitted that under the cases cited [including Warner v.
rMarkoe] the question [as to right of way] though by statute made one
of law, usually resolves itself into one of fact."
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suffer indeed if the Court had held the defendant responsible for this accident which he could by no stretch of the
imagination have foreseen, and yet that result would inevitably have come about had the statute been held to apply
in this situation. It is obvious then that while the statute
itself is silent as to its area° of applicability, it would be
overlooking realities for the Court to hold slavishly to it
in those situations which would make it productive only of
injustice. However, it is not to be forgotten that in trying
to produce equitable results, the Court increases the odds
against one's being able to predict the outcome of such
litigation. If the statute were to be inexorably applied,
there would be no prediction problem whatsoever, but
as it is applied only in "appropriate circumstances",8 7 and
not otherwise, the prediction becomes correspondingly
complicated.
The Court seems to have been aware of this feeling, for
in a case some three years later," it took considerable pains
to outline its position, and to bolster it with other authorities
in accord. After citing several cases previously referred to
herein,3 9 it quoted at some length from the standard text
on the subject :40
"The occasion for applying the rule concerning the
right of way of vehicles approaching from the right
arises only when the two vehicles approach the intersection so nearly at the same time, and at such distances
and speeds, that a collision is probable unless one of
them slows up.
"In that situation, the regulations, properly construed require that the vehicle on the left must give
way to the one on the right. The test of whether a
collision would be likely to occur is the judgment of a
man of ordinary prudence in the same situation, exercising due care, and the rule does not warrant drivers
of vehicles in taking close chances.
"If both cars reach the crossing at the same time,
the one approaching from the right is entitled to the
Supra, n. 34, 357.
u Bode v. Coal Co., 172 Md. 406, 191 A. 685 (1937).
U See supra, ns. 11, 22, 28, 29, 30, 34.
'
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right of way, and the other must, if necessary, stop and
permit it to pass in safety, and, if the driver approaching an intersection from the left sees a vehicle coming
from the right, at such a rate of speed, and at such a
point on the intersecting street, as will bring the car
approaching from the right into collision with his own,
if he proceeds along his ° respective line of approach
at his respective rate of speed, the two vehicles must
be deemed to be approaching such intersection simultaneously."'"
After the Ottenritter case of 1926, the course for decisions in right of way litigation, while not a perfect blueprint, nevertheless became channellized as well as could
be expected, considering the various complicating factors
and circumstances which played a part in all such matters.
It had come to be accepted that the unfavored driver might
well be successful in the prosecution of his suit when he
showed that the defendant was, in the language of the
Ottenrittercase, so far from the intersection when the plaintiff entered it that the defendant's car "could not come into
dangerous proximity to his (plaintiff's) own unless it were
unlawfully operated".42 This state of affairs continued until
1939 when the court decided Askin v. Long,43 a case ranking
second only in importance to the Ottenritter case both as
to its immediate effect and subsequent impact on this phase
of the law. Just as some of the prior cases had contained
elements of speed or recklessness which made it inequitable
for the Court to apply the statutory right of way rule in
its strict form, and resulted in developing a technique
whereby these cases were judged under the common law
or reciprocal rights theory, the Askin case contained elements which made it inequitable in the eyes of the court
to allow recovery in a situation which, from the record,
4
appeared to be but another of the Ottenritter type.
"Ibid., pocket supp. (1949), cites Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A. 2d 792
(1948), discussed infra, circa ns. 60-65, as supporting his statement:
"The rule in a number of jurisdictions is that ordinarily a vehicle
which first reaches or enters an intersection has the right of way over
a vehicle approaching from the left."
"151 Md. 525, supra,n. 11, 531.
"176 Md. 545, 6 A. 2d 246 (1939), supra, ns. 33, 36.
"Circa ns. 11 to 18, supra.

19501

AUTOMOBILE RIGHT OF WAY

The accident occurred at 39th Street and Greenway,
both very wide streets intersecting at an acute angle of
about 60 degrees. Plaintiff was going East on 39th Street,
and he testified that as he got to the intersection of Greenway, he looked to his right and "saw this car approaching
around 200 to 225 feet down Greenway, and I had plenty of
time to go on and I started across the intersection and when
I got half way through I heard the screech of brakes and he
hit into me. . ."I' He further stated that he was going
about 20 miles an hour as he approached Greenway. Defendant testified that he was going 20 to 25 miles an hour North
on Greenway, and at 39th Street he looked to his right and
saw nothing, and then he looked to his left and saw a truck
"approaching me about - I had about 10 feet to stop when
I saw the truck and I could not stop in 10 feet".4 6 He stated
that both he and plaintiff arrived at the corner at about the
same time, and he hit the right rear of plaintiff's truck.
There was testimony that defendant left skid marks of 14
or 15 paces, "indicating", said the Court, ". . . that, while
(defendant) was more than 10 feet away when he became
aware of the (plaintiff's) truck in the intersection, he did
not see it until the danger of collision was imminent."4' 7
In the course of the opinion, the Court quoted several
questions and answers of plaintiff on cross-examination as
follows: 4
"'Q. Where were you when you first saw this automobile?
'A. I was just entering from the other side to go
through the intersection to the other side.
'Q. Where was the other automobile when you first
saw it?
'A. I guess 120 or 125 - when I first got there he
was about 200 feet;' where he first saw it, it was 200
feet away.
'Q. Had you reached the intersection or just where
were you?
Supra, n. 43, 548.
, Supra, n. 43, 550.
7Ibid
'8Supra, n.43, 54&
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'A. At that time I was going over my intersection
because I slowed the truck down.
'Q. How far was he away from you at that time?
'A. I guess 120 feet.
'Q. You said when you first saw him he was 200
feet away?
'A. Yes, sir, when I went to make the intersection
he was coming towards me....
'Q. How far was he away?
'A. About 120 feet when I was going over the intersection....
'Q. Where was the car vhen you first saw it 200 feet
away?
'A. He was 120 feet - he was coming at such a rate
of speed....
'Q. Where was your car with respect to 39th and
Greenway when you first saw the other car 200 feet
away?
'A. I was right here at this building line (the space
from building line to curb is 25 feet).'"
The Court in reversing without new trial a verdict
for plaintiff below had this to say about the plaintiff's
testimony: 19
"What he evidently resorts to is to build up a case of
defendants' negligence by his statements of distances,
which will not stand close analysis. One cannot tell
whether he first saw the defendants' car at 200 feet or
120 feet, or was unaware of its nearness until he heard
the screeching of its brakes .... The plaintiff does not
testify as to the speed of the defendants' car, but he
tried to leave the impression that it was traveling at a
much greater speed than permitted by law, and that
such violation was the proximate cause of the collision....
"*. , the plaintiff's evidence was so inconclusive,
contradictory, and uncertain as to not be accepted as
the basis of a legal conclusion. .. ."
Then the Court turned to the right of way rule invoked
by both parties to end its opinion: 50
19Supra, n. 43, 549.

5 Supra, n. 43, 552.

19501

AUTOMOBILE RIGHT OF WAY

"The rule was designed to prevent collisions and
accidents. When there is a collision at such a place, and
the unfavored driver sues, he must show not only negligence on the part of the defendant, without which the
accident would not have happened, but also that he
was careful and cautious. His care and caution must be
determined by the facts, and not by the mere assertion
that he was careful, but by what he did to guard against
and prevent collision with favored traffic."
On its face, the Askin case was one which at first blush
would appear to be but another link in the chain of cases
beginning with Ottenritter and continuing through Jersey
Ice Cream Co. v. Bach5 to Warner v. Markoe52 all decided in
favor of the unfavored plaintiff, who testified he entered the
intersection when defendant was so far away that no danger
of collision existed, and holding that the right of way rule
was not absolute, since the question could only be determined by the facts and circumstances in each case. However, here the unfavored plaintiff met rebuff, and violently.
This situation was not considered to be like the preceding
cases because here the plaintiff's testimony was "so inconclusive, contradictory and uncertain as to not be accepted
as the basis of a legal conclusion"." Why is this so? Does
the series of questions and answers presented above prove
so conclusively to those who are familiar with the slips of
the tongue and unintended contradictions at trial, especially
on cross-examination, that the plaintiff's testimony is not
worthy of regard. That these questions and answers show
confusion on the part of the plaintiff is true; that they indicate he was having as many words as possible put in his
mouth by counsel for defendant is obvious to all; but is it so
obvious that his testimony was so unworthy of credence as
not to form a basis of a legal conclusion? The Court stressed
the plaintiff's error in guessing correctly the number of
feet away the defendant was when first seen. While speculation of course never alters results, it would be interesting
to inquire as to the probable results in this case if the court
51161 Md. 285, supra, n. 28.
171 Md. 351, 8upra, n. 34.
176 Md. 545, supra, n. 43, 551.
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had chosen to find flaws in the defendant's testimony relative to how far he was from the plaintiff when he first saw
him. There was testimony by a policeman that defendant
left a 14 or 15 pace skid mark. Obviously in the short time
it would take defendant to apply his brakes and for the
brakes to catch, his car would have moved forward several
feet, and this added to the 35 or 40 foot skid mark noted
above, would tend to indicate that the defendant was in
error in his estimates of both distance and speed. However, the court approached the case from another tack and
passed over this suggested possibility with the remark that
"... while (defendant) was more than 10 feet away when
he became aware of the (plaintiff's) truck in the intersection, he did not see it until the danger of collision was
imminent. ' 54 The court was presented here with a choice
of believing either the plaintiff or the defendant with attendant results. Why should the court turn away from the
Ottenrittercase as it did? There seems to be more than a
little to be said on behalf of the plaintiff, and it is submitted
that the court had to make a choice in this instance of following the Ottenritterdoctrine and holding for the plaintiff,
or of distinguishing the case on its facts, thus taking it out
of that category. It was admitted that both parties had unobstructed views of each other for some 200 feet before the
collision,5 5 and should recovery be allowed to the unfavored
plaintiff, it would seem that many of the rules hitherto
built up in this field would be destroyed. The court had
then to find some deus ex machina, as they so successfully
had managed to do in a preceding case,5 6 by means of which
they could achieve a workable solution. The solution was,
of course, to characterize the plaintiff's testimony as inconclusive and thus deny him recovery on the strength of what
one could argue was equally inconclusive testimony on the
part of the defendant.
The court must have felt that this case was not the type
of case in which an application of the Ottenritter doctrine
Supra, n. 43, 550.
Supra, n. 43, 547.
'Webb-Pepploe v. Cooper, 159 Md. 426. 151 A. 235 (1930), discussed in
Due and Bishop .. ,11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
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would secure desirable results, and so recovery was denied.
Thus another point on the line was pricked out in the Askin
case, and yet to be able to tell just where Ottenritterends
and Askin takes up, remains somewhat of an enigma. We
find a subsequent case, apparently closely allied to this one
on its facts, in which the court, instead of following the
Askin case, allowed recovery by the unfavored driver,5 7
thus casting considerable doubt as to just what rule will
be applied in such situations. Two possibilities are ever
present; either the Ottenritter or the Askin case can be
chosen as controlling - and who can say which the court
will choose?5 8
Subsequent cases reflect the Court's awareness of this
troublesome problem, and the result seems to have been an
attempt to mark out anew just what its present position is
in the field.5"
a 7Legum v. Hough, 63 A. 2d 316, supra, n. 18.
In Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265, 269, 23 A. 2d 694 (1942), they chose
the Askin result, in reversing without new trial a verdict for the unfavored
driver, who turned left in front of approaching defendant when defendant
was over 100 feet away, saying:
"There is no doubt that appellant's truck in driving straight through
the green light was in the favored position and had the right of way,
and the driver of that truck was the favored driver and the appellee was
the unfavored driver ....
The primary cause of the collision was the
violation of the right of way of appellant's heavy truck by the appellee.
The defendant's prayer for a directed verdict . . . should have been
granted."
The role of Askin v. Long in these cases is a difficult one to appraise,
and one is hard put to it to place the case in any particular category, because we find it cited in support of many different propositions of law,
namely: that the general right of way rule, although made one of law
by the statute "usually resolves itself into one of fact", with the result that
the rule has come to be regarded as a mere cautionary guide rather than a
peremptory command, and affords little protection to the traveling public,
Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 131 (1939); that where the failure to
yield the statutory right of way amounts to the sole and proximate cause
of the accident, the case should be withdrawn from the jury on the grounds
of the contributory negligence of the unfavored driver, Wagner v. Page,
179 Md. 465, 474 (1941) ; that when the unfavored driver sues the favored
driver, he must show not only negligence on the part of the other, but that
he himself was careful and cautious, Gudelsky v. Boone, 180 Md. 265, 269
(1942) ; that while the chief care of a driver is to his right, still he is not
by the statute relieved of the necessity of seeing that the way to his left
is clear of vehicles, and that the question of right of way Is usually one of
fact although governed by statute, Clautice v. Murphy, 180 Md. 558, 564
(1942) ; that if a witness testifies to having looked and not having seen
what, if the witness had looked, she must have seen, the conclusion is that
either she did not look or did in fact see the car approach the point of the
accident, Wallace v. Fowler, 183 Md. 97, 103 (1944) ; that where the witness
says one thing at one time and another at another time, his testimony will
be too inconclusive, contradictory, and uncertain for the basis of a legal
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In Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis60 the Court traces the history of right of way from the common law rule that "the
first driver to enter the intersection has the right of way",61
through the statutory rule as enacted in Maryland, stating
that the purpose of the rule was to direct the order of precedence as between vehicles approaching an intersection in
such manner that if both continue, a collision will result.
It notes that the statute "does not specify how near a
vehicle approaching from the right must be to the intersection in order to have the right of way",62 pointing out at the
same time that, conversely, it does not specify "what must
be the proximity of the vehicle from the left to the point of
possible collision in order that the approach of one at a
greater distance from the right may be disregarded".6 3 It
then concludes:64
"We recognize that it would be difficult to prescribe
such limitations (as to distance) upon the rule in view
of the diversity of circumstances to which it might be
applied, and we would not be justified in enforcing the
rule according to any specific measure of distance,
conclusion, State v. Carroll-Howard Sup. Co., 183 Md. 293, 299 (1944) ; that
where an intersection is not a "stop" intersection, "the taxi driver's failure
to look to the left would be evidence of negligence, even though he had the
right of way over a vehicle coming from the left", Belle Isle Cab Co. v.
Pruitt, 187 Md. 174, 184 (1946) ; that a vehicle from the right does not have
an absolute right of way regardless of its distance from the intersection
when the other vehicle is seen, and that the statutory rule is a mere cautionary guide which qualifies but does not abrogate the common law rule,
and that the question whether a vehicle coming from the right is near
enough to the intersection to have the right of way over the one from the
left is to be determined by the circumstances of each case, Wlodkowski v.
Yerkaitis, 57 A. 2d 792, 795 (1948) ; that the Court of Appeals has made it
clear that the statutory right of way rule must not be ignored, that the
first thought of a driver should be for those on his right, and too much stress
cannot be laid on looking to the right, and further, that while the Court
has continually held the right of way rule gives only a relative right dependent on the facts of each case, still, where the evidence unquestionably shows that the unfavored driver violated the rule and the violation
was a contributing cause of the accident, the case should be withdrawn from
the jury on the grounds of his contributory negligence, Bush v. Mohrlein, 62
A. 2d 301, 303 (1948) ; that when both vehicles approach an intersection so
that if one does not stop, an accident will occur, the one on the left should
yield the right of way to the one on the right, though the one on the right
does not have an absolute right of way in all situations that may arise,
Graff v. Davidson Transfer and Storage Co., 65 A. 2d 566, 568 (1949).
1057 A. 2d 792 (1948), supra, ns. 41, 59.
Ibid., 794.
" Ibid.
6Ibid.
1Ibid.
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which the legislature has not found it expedient to
adopt.
"Inasmuch as a vehicle approaching from the right
does not have an absolute right of way in every instance, regardless of its distance from the intersection
when the other vehicle enters from the left, the statutory right of way rule is regarded as a cautionary guide,
rather than a peremptory command. The statutory rule
qualifies the common law rule giving the right of way
to the first arrival at an intersection, but does not
abrogate it.... The question whether a vehicle coming
from the right is sufficiently near the intersection to
have the right of way over a vehicle coming from the
left must be determined
from the circumstancesin each
'65
particularcase.
This language is definitive of the Court's position today,
and illustrates quite graphically the view held with relation
to the right of way statute.
This case also contains the first extended discussion of
contributory negligence in such situations. The difficulty
arises over the question of whether or not the violation of
the statute should be treated as negligence as a matter of
law, or whether the violation is to be regarded only as
evidence of negligence, leaving it to the jury to determine
whether or not it is enough to hold the violator remediless
in his action. There is no question but that this decision
is a delicately balanced one, and it is not made any easier
by reason of the fact that the matters involved in the trial
are ones usually quite factually familiar to the jury as well
as to the judge.6 6 It is all too apparent that in the face of
these facts the decision as to whether or not the case should
be withdrawn from the jury is not an easy one, and from
the way it was handled on appeal, we find this view reflected
67
in the opinion:
"No absolute rule declaring what constitutes contributory negligence can be formulated to apply to all
cases, because, like primary negligence, it is relative
and not absolute, and it necessarily depends upon the
Italics supplied.
Supra, n. 27.
Supra,n. 60, 795.
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circumstances of each particular case. Unless the action
of the plaintiff relied on as amounting to contributory
negligence is established by clear and uncontradicted
evidence, the case should not be withdrawn from the
jury, and where the nature of the act relied on to
establish contributory negligence can be determined
only from all the circumstances surrounding the accident it is within the province of the jury to characterize
it. Where there is a conflict of evidence as to material
facts relied on to establish contributory negligence, or
the act is of such a nature that reasonable minds, after
considering all the circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident, may draw different conclusions
as to whether it constituted contributory negligence,
the court should not withdraw the case from the conWe specifically hold that
sideration of the jury ....
where, in an action for damages resulting from an automobile collision at a street intersection, the evidence is
conflicting, or more than one inference may be reasonably drawn therefrom, the question of contributory
negligence is one of fact for the jury.""8
Legum v. Hough 9 followed shortly thereafter, and presented anew the case of a suit by the unfavored driver
against the favored driver, alleging that when he was 8 feet
from the curb line of the cross street, he saw defendant 120
feet away on his right. He said he thought he had time to
cross, and he proceeded to do so without ever looking to
his right again, as he was watching two pedestrians on the
sidewalk about 25 feet beyond the intersection. He was
struck on the right front of his car when he was about twothirds of the way across the street. The lower court reMAccord, see Bush v. Mohrlein, 62 A. 2d 301, 303 (1948), where the Court.
finding, despite unfavored plaintiff's testimony that he looked to his right
before he entered the intersection and saw nothing, that both drivers reached
the crossing at about the same time, said:
"While we have consistently held that the Maryland right of way
statute gives only a relative right dependent upon the circumstances of
each particular case, we also hold that where the evidence unquestionably shows that the unfavored driver violated the statutory rule,
and the violation was a contributing cause of the accident, the court
should withdraw his case from the jury on the grounds of his contribu"
tory negligence., Askin v. Long ..
It is of interest that this case contained the same element of untrustworthiness as In the Askin case, thus making it an ideal vehicle for the same
doctrine.
63 A. 2d 316, supra, ns. 18,"57.
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fused defendant's motion for directed verdict, and this was
affirmed on appeal. The sole question on appeal was as to
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and the Court
stated, ° "For present purposes we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to appellee (plaintiff).
Unless his failure to yield the right of way was a negligent
and contributing cause of the collision, as a matter of law,
the issue would be one for the jury."
The Court relied on the Ottenritter case here, holding
that the unfavored driver "should not judicially be declared
negligent in not providing against the possibility of collision with a car which could not come into dangerous
proximity to his own, unless it were unlawfully operated".71

It continued: 72
"The limited effect thus given to the right of way
rule has not escaped criticism. In Askin v. Long .. .
Judge Sloan, speaking for the Court, said: 'It must be
admitted that, under the cases cited, the question,
though by statute made one of law, usually resolves
itself into one of fact.' . . . Nevertheless, although a
more stringent rule, comparable to the 'stop, look and
listen' rule, has been applied in cases where traffic is
controlled by lights . . .or by stop signs, . . .the rule
announced in the Ottenritter case is still the law
' '73 of
Maryland, in the case of uncontrolled crossings.
The opinion could very well have rested there had there
not been strong reliance by appellant on the Askin case as
being controlling here. The Court distinguished the case,
on the ground that in the Askin case the plaintiff had variously estimated the distance of the favored vehicle when
he first saw it, from 200 to 45 feet, and that while plaintiff
had been unable to estimate the speed of the other car, there
was evidence that it was not operated over the speed limit.7
Since there was no direct evidence of excessive speed on
the part of the defendant (plaintiff having inferred speed
-oIbid., 317.
"Ibid.
lIbid,, 318.
Italics supplied.
" See circa, ns. 30-33, for discussion as to the inconclusiveness "in fact" of

such testimony.
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of defendant rather than showing it), and "no credible testimony as to the distance of the favored vehicle when the
unfavored vehicle began to cross, no inference could be
drawn that it was safe for the unfavored vehicle to proceed".75 Those facts, the Court felt, were the delineating
factors to be stressed. In the instant case the plaintiff was
8 feet from the intersection when he first saw the defendant
120 feet away, and at that time the plaintiff had only some
50 feet to traverse before clearing the intersection, and,
the Court says, if both had been traveling at the same rate
of speed, the plaintiff would have been 75 feet past the intersection when the defendant reached it. "We cannot say
as a matter of law that it was his (plaintiff's) duty to stop
7'
under such circumstances."
One is inclined to wonder why the New York case" set
forth in Bush v. Mohrlein78 only a few days before the
Legum trial was not more persuasive with the Court here.
The facts seem to be similar to those in the Legum case in
that in the New York case "the unfavored driver saw a car
approaching on an intersecting street at a distance and at
a speed which threatened a collision, but, without looking
again, proceeded in his course until a collision occurred
."79

The New York Court in its opinion said: 80

"It would be our duty, under any circumstances, to
enforce such reasonable observance of this rule which
the Legislature has adopted for the safety of travelers,
and certainly that duty is not rendered any the less
commanding when we consider the number of accidents
now being caused by heedless management of automobiles ....
This plaintiff invited his own disaster, and
he is entitled to no relief from the courts."
63 A- 2d 316, 8upra, n. 18, 318.
"The same might be said of the only remaining case in this field, Graff v.
Davidson Transfer and Storage Co., 65 A. 2d 566 (1949). This too is of the
Ottenritter type where favored driver was so far away when other driver
entered the intersection that a collision could not have taken place if favored
driver were driving within the speed limit. The proximate cause of the
collision then was not the failure of unfavored driver to yield the right of
way, but rather the excessive speed on part of the otherwise favored driver.
1Shirley v. Larkin Co., 239 N. Y. 94, 145 N. E. 751.
62 A. 2d 301, 8upra, n. 68.
7 bit., 303.
8 Supra, n. 77,'96, 752.
..
..
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Despite the fact that such language would seem to apply
to the Legum case, the court never referred to it in that
opinion, and the unfavored plaintiff's recovery was affirmed.
We have attempted here to present but one of the myriad
of facets in this field of negligence law. Even then, in the
deliberately narrow scope of this article, summation is
difficult. Perhaps the only answer lies in an appreciation
of the thought expressed most clearly once again by Mr.
Justice Holmes when many years ago he presented a general view, not of just one field of the law, but a synthesis
of the entire Common Law: '
"The life of that law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We
must alternately consult history and existing theories
of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products
at every stage. The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with
what is then understood to be convenient; but its forms
and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to
work out desired results, depend very much upon its
past....
"The question what a prudent man would do under
given circumstances is then equivalent to the question
what are the teachings of experience as to the dangerous character of this or that conduct under these or
those circumstances; and as the teachings of experience
are matters of fact, it is easy to see why the jury should
be consulted with regard to them. They are, however,
facts of a special and peculiar function. Their only
bearing is on the question, what ought to have been
Holmes, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
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done or omitted under the circumstances of the case,
not on what was done. Their function is to suggest a
role of conduct."
Such was his introduction to The Common Law, and it
will serve excellently to sum up that which has gone before
in this Article.
The touchstone for the problem of prediction in these
cases is pointed out to us as experience. We cannot by any
means reject logic, but we see that for Justice Holmes
''experience was the starting point where logic began; and
where different logics clashed, experience was used as a
touchstone for the selection of the relevant logic" . s2 In
order to predict with any hope of accuracy the result of a
given set of facts, we must view them in the light of the
present, not failing, however, at the same time to take into
account the results of prior cases on similar facts. Things
are reasonable, for example, in the realm of speed today
which would have been patently unreasonable several years
ago. These factors, together with those other variations
due to technical and mechanical developments in the automotive field, present public policy, and past as well as
present legislation must all be grouped together and studied
with more than passing curiosity before attempting to
answer any posed questions in this field. Certain it is that
no specific rule can be laid down which will solve all the
problems which will arise.
In each new case, the lawyer must use the tests of logic
and experience to appraise his case in the light of what the
Court of Appeals was seeking to accomplish, through the
application of its logic and experience in the cases we have
here reviewed.
Max Lerner,

THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1943), p. 46.

